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CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH
AND SEIZURES AND THERMAL IMAGING*
UnitedStates v. Kyllo, 140 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 1998)
Mark D. Kiser*
Appellant was arrested and charged with manufacturing marijuana after
federal law enforcement officers searched Appellant's house and found an
indoor marijuana growing operation Before obtaining a search warrant,
a National Guardsman used a thermal imager' to measure the heat emitted
from Appellant's home.3 Based on the thermal imager readings,4 a federal
officer obtained a warrant to search Appellant's home and discovered the
illegal marijuana operation.'
Appellant moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that it was
obtained as part of an unreasonable search.' The trial court denied the
motion and found that the government's use of the thermal imager was not
an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.7 The United States
Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit remanded the case back to the trial
court for a determination of the thermal imager's technical capacities.' On
remand, the trial court found that the thermal imager did not reveal
intimate details of Appellant's home. The court, therefore, found that the
thermal scan did not qualify as a search under the Fourth Amendment.9
* Editor's Note: This Case Comment received the George W. Milam Award for the
Outstanding Case Comment written during the Fall 1998 Semester.
** This Case Comment is dedicated to my parents. I cannot adequately thank them for their
support and instruction throughout the years. I would also like to thank Professor Teresa Rambo,
who gave me the idea for this topic.
1. See United States v. Kyllo, 140 F.3d 1249, 1250-51 (9th Cir. 1998).
2. See id. A thermal imager observes and records the heat patterns emanating from objects
within its view. See id. at 1251. The heat differentials are displayed on a viewfinder with an object's
heat emissions represented by a lighter or darker color. See id.
3. See id.
4. The thermal readings in this case detected the heat emitted by the high intensity grow
lamps used in Appellant's indoor cultivation of marijuana. See id,
5. See i& The thermal imager data was one of several pieces of information on which a
search warrant was granted by a federal magistrate judge. Among the other information was the
observation of unusually high power usage at Appellant's house, information provided by an
informant and other circumstantial evidence. See id. at 1250.
6. See United States v. Kyllo, 809 F. Supp. 787,789 (D. Or. 1992).
7. See id. at 792.
8. See United States v. Kyllo, 37 F.3d 526,531 (9th Cir. 1994).
9. See United States v. Kyllo, No. CR. 92-51-FR, 1996 WL 125594, at *2 (D. Or. Mar. 15,
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The Ninth Circuit reversed and HELD, that the law enforcement officers'
use of a thermal imager to detect heat emitted from Appellant's home
revealed intimate details of Appellant's home and, therefore, constituted
a search for which a warrant was required."0
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides the
right of the "people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."" Early Supreme
Court decisions limited Fourth Amendment protection to people and
places." However, the Supreme Court altered its view of Fourth
Amendment protection in its landmark decision, Katz v. United States, 3
by finding that the Fourth Amendment protects "people, not places."' 4
In Katz, the Court addressed the issue of whether the government can
electronically eavesdrop on a telephone conversation that takes place inside
a public phone booth. 5 To obtain evidence of Petitioner's transmission of
wagering information across telephone lines, FBI agents used an electronic
listening and recording device to eavesdrop on Petitioner's conversations
in a public telephone booth.' 6 Based on this evidence, the petitioner was
subsequently convicted. 7
In reversing the petitioner's conviction, the Court focused on the
petitioner's expectations and not the fact that the telephone booth was a
public place.' Accordingly, the Court determined that once the petitioner
entered the phone booth and shut the door behind him, he could "assume
that the words he utter[ed] into the mouthpiece [would] .. .not be
1996). A separate opinion involves the use of firearms found in Kyllo's home to enhance the
sentencing. See United States v. Kyllo, CR No. 92-51-FR, 1996 WL 571832, at *1 (D. Or. Oct 3,
1996). The court found this to be improper because the guns should not have been found to be
connected with the marijuana growing. See id. at *3.The court did not comment on the thermal
imager's intrusiveness and the Fourth Amendment. See id.
10. See Kyllo, 140 F.3d at 1254-55. Because the thermal scan constituted an unreasonable
search of Appellant's home, the court found that it should not have been considered by the
magistrate in determining whether to grant a search warrant. See id. at 1255. However, the court
did not decide whether the evidence, other than the thermal scan, was sufficient to support a search
warrant. See id4 Therefore, the court remanded the issue back to the district court to decide whether
the other evidence provided to the magistrate judge, excluding the thermal readings, was sufficient
to sustain a search warrant. See id.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
12. See generally Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (finding that
wiretapping did not violate the Fourth Amendment because that amendment was meant to protect
"material" things, such as places or areas, whereas wiretapping involves hearing, a non-material
thing).
13. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
14. Id. at 351.
15. See id. at 348.
16. See iL
17. See id.
18. See id. at 353.
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broadcast to the world. 1 9 By focusing on Petitioner's expectations, the
Court also established that the presence or absence of a physical intrusion
into the booth was constitutionally insignificant.'
Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz provided a two-part test which has
become the modem framework in which courts analyze Fourth
Amendment search and seizure issues.21 The first question is whether a
person exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy' in the
object of the challenged search. The second question is whether that
privacy expectation is one that society would recognize as reasonable
(objective).23 In agreeing with the majority, Justice Harlan found that the
phone booth was a temporarily private place, making the petitioner's
momentary expectation of privacy reasonable.2
The second prong of the Katz test has been criticized for its inability to
uphold Fourth Amendment protections in the face of new technologies.'
As surveillance technologies become more sophisticated and widespread,
individuals will necessarily enjoy lesser expectations of privacy. 26 Thus, as
thermal imagers become more common, it is increasingly unreasonable for
individuals to expect that their activities will not be monitored by such
devices.27 Despite its shortcomings, the Katz test remains the criteria courts
use to determine whether the Fourth Amendment applies to a specific
situation.'
The Eighth Circuit, in UnitedStates v. Pinson,29 was the first circuit to
use the Katz test in a case involving a thermal imager scan.30 In Pinson,
19. Id. at 352.
20. See i. at 353.

21. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
22. See id. Justice Harlan provided examples of when an individual might manifest a
subjective expectation of privacy. See id. He stated that a person's home is a place where a person
would have an expectation of privacy which extends to the objects or activities within the home.
See id. However, "objects, activities, or statements that... [an individual] exposes to the 'plain

view' of outsiders are not 'protected' because no intention to keep them to himself has been
exhibited." Id
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See generally Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a FourthAmendment for the Twenty-first
Century, 65 IND. L.J. 549,564-65 (1990) (noting that as the Katz test evolved, it has "strip[ped] the
individual of a great measure of [F]ourth [A]mendment protection... as a result of living in a hightech society'); Wayne R. LaFave, The ForgottenMotto of Obsta Principiisin FourthAmendment
Jurisprudence, 28 ARIz. L. REV. 291, 309-10 (1986) (cautioning that under the Katz test,

individuals cannot protect their privacy in the face of advancing technology).
26. See Katz, supra note 25, at 564-65.
27. See &l.
28. See Douglas A. Kash, PrewarrantThermal Imaging as a FourthAmendment Violation:
A Supreme Court Question in the Making, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1295, 1301 (1997).
29. 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 1994).
30. Indeed, many courts have been reluctant to address theissue ofthermalimaging, and have
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Drug Enforcement Agency agents performed an aerial surveillance3 of
Appellant's home, using a thermal imager to detect heat emissions.32 Based
on these thermal readings, the agents obtained a search warrant and

discovered a marijuana growing operation inside Appellant's home.33

In applying the first prong of the Katz test, the court found that

Appellant did not manifest a subjective expectation of privacy.' 4 The court

reasoned that the heat given off by the grow lamps was simply "heat
waste" 35 which Appellant could not expect to remain private.36
Furthermore, the court found that even if Appellant could satisfy the first
prong of Katz, his privacy expectation would not be one that society would
recognize as objectively reasonable.37 Again, the court relied on the waste
heat approach, and analogized the abandoned heat to garbage left at the
curb38 and odors emanating from luggage. 39 Like bagged garbage and these
odors, the waste heat was voluntarily vented outside Appellant's home

instead held that evidence other than thermal readings was sufficient to support a search warrant.
See, e.g., United States v. Cusumano, 83 F.3d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that it was
"neither necessary nor wise" to decide whether the use of a thermal imager to scan a residence
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Deaner, 1 F.3d 192,202 (3d
Cir. 1993) (holding that marijuana leaves and stems in Appellant's garbage established probable
cause, thus obviating the need to decide the constitutionality of a thermal scan); United States v.
Casanova, 835 F. Supp. 702, 708 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that an informant's tips established
probable cause, thus foreclosing an inquiry into whether a thermal scan constituted a search under
the Fourth Amendment).
31. See Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1057. Although the agents scanned the residence from a
helicopter, the court limited its analysis of Fourth Amendment protection to the use of the thermal
imager and did not consider the constitutionality of the low helicopter flight. See id.
at 1057-58.
32. See id. at 1057.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 1058.
35. Id.
The court relied on UnitedStates v. Penny-Feeney,773 F. Supp. 220 (D. Haw. 1991),
aj'd on othergroundssub nom, United States v. Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993), for the
"heat waste" framework. The Penny court found that a thermal imager only measured abandoned
heat leaking from a building for which the property owner could not manifest a subjective
expectation of privacy. See Penney-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 226-28.
36. See Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1058.
37. See id. at 1059.
38. See id.
at 1058-59. The Supreme Court, in Californiav. Greenwood,486 U.S. 35 (1988),
held that a property owner did not have an expectation of privacy for bagged garbage left outside
his residence. See id. at 39-41. Therefore, the police's warrantless search and seizure of the garbage
did not violate the Fourth Amendment. See id.
39. See Pinson,24 F.3d at 1058-59. The Supreme Court, in United Statesv. Place,462 U.S.
696 (1983), held that the use of nonintrusive equipment, such as a police trained dog to sniff
luggage for the presence of narcotics, did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. See
Place,462 U.S. at 707.
40. See Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1058. The court did not discuss any specific measures Appellant
took to actively expel the heat, yet still found that it was "voluntarily vented" outside, through a
skylight and the roof. Id. at 1057-58.
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and therefore he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy for that
heat.41
The court also focused on the technical capacity of the thermal imager,
and concluded that it did not reveal any intimate details of the home.42
Indeed, the court found that "[n]one of the interests which form the basis
for the need for protection of a residence, namely the intimacy, personal
autonomy43and privacy associated with a home, are threatened by thermal
inagery.v

The first circuit court case 4 to hold that a thermal imager scan was a
search under the Fourth Amendment was UnitedStates v. Cusumano.45 In
Cusumano, once again, criminal investigation agents scanned Appellant's
home with a thermal imager, which led to a search warrant and Appellant's
subsequent arrest for marijuana cultivation. 46 In applying the Katz test, the
Cusumano court rejected the waste heat approach adopted by other circuits
up to that point.47
In applying the first prong of the Katz test, the Cusumano court
reasoned that the other circuits had misframed the relevant Fourth
Amendment inquiry.S Instead of asking whether Appellant had an
expectation of privacy in the heat emitted, the court looked at the link

41. See id. at 1058.
42. See id. at 1059. The intimate details language comes from the United States Supreme
Court case Dow Chem. Co. v. UnitedStates,476 U.S. 227,238 (1986). In Dow, the Court analyzed
the constitutionality of the government's use of a "precision aerial mapping camera" to view a
private corporation's industrial complex. Id.at 229. The Court found that the camera was not "so
revealing of intimate details as to raise constitutional concerns." Id.at 238. Although the camera
enhanced human vision it still only provided an outline of the buildings and equipment on the
complex. See id The Court contrasted this mere enhancement of human vision with an electronic
device which could penetrate walls or windows so as to hear orrecord confidential discussions. See
iULat 238-39.
43. Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1059.
44. Indeed, after Pinson, other circuits had found that a thermal imaging scan of a home does
not implicate the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668,670 (7th Cir.
1995) (discussing thermal surveillance of a house); United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992,993 (1 lth
Cir. 1994) (discussing thermal surveillance of a mobile home); see also United States v. Ishmael,
48 F.3d 850, 853 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that a thermal imager scan of an open field did not
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment).
45. 67 F.3d 1497(10th Cir. 1995), vacatedonothergrounds,83 F.3d 1247(10th Cir. 1996).
Although the first Cusumanocase was subsequently vacated, the vacating court specifically stated
that "we do not decide whether the use of a thermal imager to detect heat emissions from a personal
residence constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment." Cusumano, 83 F.3d at 1248. The
vacating court found that even without the thermal imager evidence, there was enough evidence to
support the issuance of a search wan-ant, and so the court specifically did not decide the
constitutionality of a thermal scan. See id. at 1248-49.
46. See Cusumano, 67 F.3d at 1499.
47. See id. at 1501.
48. See id.at 1500.
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between the heat and activities inside the home.49 The court reasoned that
the true value of the imager was what it revealed about the inside of
Appellant's home.50 Therefore, the court determined that the object of the
scan was the activity inside the house, and not the heat emitted. 5' The court
concluded that by concealing the grow operation inside his house, the

defendant manifested an expectation of privacy for the heat signatures of

domestic activities.52
In regard to the second prong of the Katz test, the government argued
that a thermal imager did not intrude on a societally reasonable privacy
expectation because the imager did not reveal any intimate details of the
residence.53 The court dismissed this argument by reasoning that the device
intruded upon the privacy of the home, "not because it records white spots
on a dark background but rather because the interpretation of that data
allows the government to monitor those domestic activities that generate
a significant amount of heat."'54 The court reasoned that although the
imager did not reveal such intimate activities as occur in the bedroom, it
still stripped the home of the most important dimension of its security: "the
'right to be let alone' from the arbitrary and discretionary monitoring of
our actions by government officials."55
Finding the instant case factually similar to Cusumano,the instant court
followed the reasoning of Cusumano56 and focused on the link between

49. See idL at 1501. Specifically the court framed the issue for the first prong of Katz, as
whether the "link between the 'waste heat' observed by the imager and the activities that gave rise
to that heat [is] so attenuated as to restrict the 'expectation of privacy' analysis to the heat alone[.]"
Id. In response, the court answered, "We think not." Id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id.at 1502. The court concluded that Appellant manifested an expectation of privacy
because he located his activities within the sanctity of his home. See id. The interior of a home is
a location traditionally accorded the highest Fourth Amendment protection. See, e.g., Florida v.
Riley, 488 U.S. 445,452-55 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (upholding Fourth Amendment's
requirement of a warrant); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705,714 (1984); Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573,590 (1980); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
53. See Cusumano, 67 F.3d at 1503.
54. Id. at 1504.
55. Id.The court also recognized that technology was not static and the technical capacities
of thermal imagers would undoubtedly improve in the future. See id. By limiting the use of thermal
imagers before they are able to reveal more intimate details, the court did not allow the
reasonableness of a privacy expectation to "hinge upon the outcome of a technological race of
measure/counter-measure between the average citizen and the government[,]" a race the court
expected the people would lose, Id.
56. The dissent in the instant case obviously departed from the Cusumanoline of reasoning.
See Kyllo, 140 F.3d at 1255 (Hawkins, J., dissenting). Writing for himself, Judge Hawkins reasoned
that a search involves an "invasion of protected space." Id. Judge Hawkins did not find the thermal
imager revealed any indoor details or activities but only, "measured the heat emanating from and
on the outside of a house." Id. Judge Hawkins suggested the Ninth Circuit follow its sister circuits
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heat emissions and their corresponding indoor activities. 7 Because the
purpose of a thermal imager is to reveal the heat signatures of indoor
activities, the instant court analyzed Appellant's privacy expectation for
those indoor activities, not the heat emissions themselves." Relying on
Cusumano, the instant court concluded that Appellant manifested a
subjective expectation of privacy in the heat signatures of his domestic
activities.5 9
Regarding the second prong of the Katz test, the instant court relied on
the long recognized principle that the expectation in the privacy of a
residence is presumptively reasonable.' The court also dismissed the
government's argument that the imager did not reveal enough intimate
details to raise constitutional concerns.6 The court reasoned that even the
most routine and trivial activities within a home are sufficiently intimate
as to give rise to Fourth Amendment protection from warrantless
observations by law enforcement officers. 2 The instant court also took into
account the rapid pace of technology and decided to curb the warrantless
use of thermal imagers before they became capable of detecting even
greater intimacies.63
By rejecting the waste heat approach followed in Pinson, the instant
court more appropriately followed the Fourth Amendment analysis set
forth in Katz. In Katz, the Supreme Court could have asked whether
Appellant had an expectation of privacy in the "waste" vibrational sound
energy emitted from the phone booth.' However, the Supreme Court did
not focus on the privacy expectation of this vibrational energy and instead
focused on the expectation of privacy in the target of the
eavesdropping-Katz's conversation.'

and adopt this waste heat approach and find that a thermal scan does not constitute a search under
the Fourth Amendment. See id.

at 1253.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id.The court also reached this conclusion by relying on the United States Supreme
Court case of Californiav. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). See Kyllo, 140 F.3d at 1252-53. The
CiraoloCourt found that a defendant manifested a subjective expectation ofprivacy for his outdoor
marijuana garden by erecting two fences which blocked all ground level views of his garden.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211. The Court maintained that this subjective privacy expectation was

sufficient, even though the government observation in the case was from the air. See id.
Accordingly, the instant court reasoned that an individual, such as Appellant, who "moves his
agricultural pursuits inside his house has similarly manifested a subjective expectation of privacy
....
" Kyllo, 140 F.3d at 1253.
60. See Kyllo, 140 F.3d at 1253.
61. See hi. at 1253-54.
62. See id. at 1255.
63. See id. at 1254-55.
64. See Cusumano, 67 F.3d at 1501.
65. See id.at 1501-02.
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Similarly, the instant court rejected an analysis based on the physical
means by which law enforcement gathered information on Appellant, and
instead focused on Appellant's privacy in activities within the home.6
Such a focus more closely follows Katz than the waste heat approach
adopted in the four circuits which found no Fourth Amendment violation
for thermal imager scans. 67
The instant court's approach to the first prong of the Katz test
successfully addresses the question of advancing technology. As the
Cusumano court pointed out, when technology progresses, secrets that
society once assumed were "safely beyond the perception of the
government" become subject to exposure. 68 At the same time, however,
citizens are usually unaware of the various advancements in technology,
particularly as they relate to surveillance. Therefore, an individual's ability
to manifest a subjective expectation of privacy for a particular type of
intrusion becomes almost impossible.69
The instant court's treatment of the first prong of Katz avoids the
problem of advancing technology. As the instant court recognized, Katz
held that a defendant could manifest a subjective expectation of privacy
although he had not taken every precaution against electronic
eavesdropping.7" Therefore, Appellant's apparent failure to guard against
a thermal imager scan, provided he even knew such technology existed, did
not prevent the court from finding that Appellant manifested a subjective
expectation of privacy.7
The court's reliance on Ciraolo72 also demonstrates that an individual
does not have to take extraordinary precautions to manifest a subjective
expectation of privacy. Like the defendant in Ciraolo,the appellant in the
instant case did not successfully shield his agricultural pursuits from
government detection.7' However, the instant court did not require
Appellant to take any other steps, aside from locating his grow operation
inside, to guard against the specific type of government observation,
namely a thermal scan.7' Thus Appellant's lack of protection against a
thermal imager did not preclude him from manifesting a privacy

66. See Kyllo, 140 F.3d at 1253.
67. See cases cited supra note 45.
68. Cusumano, 67 F.3d at 1505.
69. Professor LaFave best described this problematic result as "one cannot have an
expectation of privacy unless safeguards have been put in place that ensure against even purely
hypothetical means of intrusion upon privacy." LaFave, supra note 25, at 298.
70. See Kyllo, 140 F.3d at 1253.
71. See id. at 1252-53.
72. See id.
73. See U

74. See id
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expectation. 75
The instant court's analysis of the second prong of Katz also minimizes
the criticism of the Katz test regarding advancing technology. 76 Although
the instant court analyzed the detail with which an imager could "see" the
interior of a house, the court did not base its finding solely on the ability
of the imager to reveal intimate details." The instant court recognized that
any detail regarding the interior of a home was sufficient to give rise to
Fourth Amendment protection. 8
By recognizing that the most basic details of the home are sufficiently
"intimate" to give rise to Fourth Amendment protection, 9 the instant court
assured that an individual's privacy expectation will remain reasonable
even when thermal imagers become more common. By recognizing that an
individual's expectation of privacy for any activity within the home is
virtually presumptively reasonable, the instant court protected these
activities from any type of government monitoring. Therefore, no matter
how common thermal imagers become, the court would still recognize an
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy in the activities conducted
within the home.
The split in the circuits regarding the constitutionality of thermal
imaging is one which should be resolved by the United States Supreme
Court. In the face of rapidly advancing technologies, the Supreme Court
should develop a unified method for analyzing Fourth Amendment issues
regarding the use of this technology by the government. The approach to
the Katz test taken by the instant court ensures the protection of domestic
activities from intrusive future technology. By resolving this circuit split
and adopting the reasoning of the instant court, the Supreme Court would
preserve the right of individuals to "retreat into... [the] home and there
be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."'

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

See id
See Katz, supra note 25, at 564-65; LaFave, supra note 25, at 309-10.
See Kyllo, 140 F.3d at 1254-55.
See id.
See id. at 1255.
Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511.
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